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Aberdeen, UK
ABSTRACT
By relaxing the common efficiency wage assumption of exogenous shirking detection probabilities,
we demonstrate how standards and efficiency wages are related. In a more general setting where the
probability of detection depends upon the equilibrium effort level of non-shirkers, we show that the
uniformly positive (negative) supply-side relationship between wages (unemployment insurance)
and effort is no longer guaranteed. Profit maximization on the part of the firm, however, ensures
that effort will depend positively (negatively) on wages (unemployment insurance) in equilibrium.
Keywords: efficiency wages, monitoring, standards
JEL classification: J33, J41, J54
I. INTRODUCTION
The fundamental premise of this paper is that efficiency wages and retention standards are
related. Whilst the majority of efficiency wage literature has concentrated on imperfect mon-
itoring of effort, we leave monitoring technologies aside and focus instead on the underlying
output required by the firm; that is, the minimum standard a worker must deliver to continue his
employment relationship with the firm. If wages determine effort and effort determines output,
and if a firing standard is the critical level of output below which a worker will be fired, then it
follows that wages and standards will be related. So, in a world where firms are able to observe
worker output but not underlying worker effort, and where output in turn is a function of both
luck (i.e., noise) and effort, there must exist a critical level of output below which the worker
cannot possibly be exerting the required effort. We take this critical level to be the dividing line
between a worker’s retention and dismissal. If the worker’s output falls short of this standard,
then he is fired; if it equals or exceeds the standard, then he is retained and paid the going wage
at the firm. It then follows that the higher the wage, the higher the equilibrium level of effort
and the higher the standard required of workers.
The central tenet of efficiencywage theory is that wages and effort are positively correlated. In
what follows we present a stochastic shirking model in which the robustness of this relationship
Correspondence: John G. Sessions, University of Bath Economics Claverton Down, Bath, Somerset, United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, BA24RQ. Email: j.g.sessions@bath.ac.uk. We are grateful
to two anonymous referees and the editors of this journal for helpful comments. The normal disclaimer
applies.
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2 Bulletin of Economic Research
is tested. If standards, effort and detection probabilities are interdependent, then a sufficiently
low standard will ensure that all workers are retained, albeit at low wages and effort. The higher
the standard, the higher the required effort and the higher the risk of being detected shirking. By
relaxing the literature’s common assumption of exogenous shirking detection probabilities and
considering instead the more general and endogenous case in which shirking detection depends
upon equilibrium effort, we show that the positive supply-side relationship between efficiency
wages and effort is no longer guaranteed.1 Such a failure may arise when both the cost of effort
and the probability of detection are positively correlated with effort but where the former (latter)
is positively (negatively) correlated to the wage. This result echoes findings in the monitoring
literature and is potentially troubling for efficiency wage theory. However, we demonstrate
that in our case this is purely a supply side issue. For when we consider the demand-side we
find the efficiency wage being set in a region where the elasticity of the detection probability
with respect to effort is less than unity, implying that in equilibrium effort does indeed depend
positively on the wage.
In what follows we focus on a fixed wage contract with a set output standard. Workers are
dismissed if they breach the contract by failing to perform to the standard set. Whilst this type of
contract is common in the labour market, there are alternatives.2 These can be broadly divided
into contracts where rewards and punishments depend upon either: (i) absolute performance –
for example, a piece rate in its purest form or other more complicated performance related
pay schemes;3 or (ii) relative performance – for example, the tournament models espoused
originally by Lazear and Rosen (1981).
We do not focus on the comparative merits of standards versus alternative performance
contracts as investigated by, amongst others, Gibbons and Waldmann (1999) and Ghosh and
Waldmann (2010). Instead we offer a novel approach that combines standards with efficiency
wages. Most efficiency wage models shy away from standards, though there are exceptions.
Akerlof (1982), for example, seeks to rationalise why workers would perform beyond a pre-
prescribed standard by appealing to gift exchange. We provide a different perspective; by
appealing to efficiency wages in the presence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In our model
we set out the conditions under which non-shirkers will perform at or beyond a set standard,
and show how this will at times distinguish them from shirkers.
Conventional efficiency wage theory has traditionally modelled worker effort as the outcome
of binary choice decision; workers either shirk by supplying zero effort or they work by exerting
the required level of effort. We take a broader view and model effort as a continuum that can be
exerted whether working or shirking. We interpret shirking as a neglection of duty by underper-
forming relative to a required effort level. It encompasses both the conventional zero effort view
aswell as themore general case of under-exertion in relation to the firm’s effort norm.4 Ourmodel
is therefore closely related to those of Walsh (1999), Goerke (2001), Allgulin and Ellingsen
(2002) and Strobl and Walsh (2007), all of whom also assume continuous effort.5 By so doing,
1Whilst some authors have focussed on the endogenous detection rates that arise through monitoring [see,
for example, Calvo and Wellisz (1978) for an early example and Ewing and Payne (1999) for an empirical
implementation] we consider instead the endogeneity issues that arise from the choice of effort.
2For a survey on contracts and how they operate in practice, see Malcomson (1997, 1999). For a theo-
retical exposition of incentives in the labour market and how such incentives affect payment contracts, see
Prendercast (1999).
3The study of piece rates is voluminous and has a long tradition. For early examples see Lazear (1986)
and Gibbons (1987).
4Our focus is on standards rather than the psychological norms discussed in relation to unemployment
and the labour market by Akerlof (1980) and Clark (2003).
5Hahm and Mayer (2011) show in a model of efficiency wages and search that even when effort is binary
it is possible that monitoring (or detection rates) and wages are not necessarily substitutes.
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Shirking, Standards and the Probability of Detection 3
these authors demonstrate that the trade off between monitoring and wages found in the binary
effort dual labour market models of Bulow and Summers (1986) does not automatically transfer
to the case where effort is continuous. We differ from these authors, however, by concentrating
on standards rather than monitoring. Our approach opens up a new series of results linking
standards to effort and the probability of detection. Thus, we demonstrate that shirking declines
when standards are raised. Intuitively, higher standards increase the probability of detection for
a given level of effort. As a result, shirkers, who optimise their trade-off between the cost of
effort and the risk of being identified, increase their effort in response to the increase in detection
probability.
A question worth asking is under what circumstances will a required minimum standard be
the appropriate mechanism to trigger dismissal. Is it not possible that firms could use relative
performance to dismiss employees? This would certainly appear to be the usual practice in
team sports where athletes who underperform relative to their teammates face termination of
their contracts. It follows from this that an alternative modelling strategy, in which relative
performance plays a more prominent role, might be to adapt a tournament model in the Lazear
and Rosen (1981) tradition to incentivise workers through punishment rather than reward; i.e.,
where relatively poor performing workers are sacked. From an economic perspective it makes
sense for the firm to evoke such a firing trigger strategy if performance is noisy but all employers
face the same aggregate unobserved shock. On the other hand, if shocks are idiosyncratic
rather than common, as in our model, then tournaments are dominated by contracts as initially
demonstrated by Green and Stokey (1982). Our paper therefore does not follow the tournament
route but is more akin to the literature on standards or thresholds as part of incentive schemes.
Although these have been typically ignored in the efficiency wage literature, they have a long
tradition elsewhere. For instance, an early exposition by Mirrlees (1974) investigates how it
might be optimal to punish agents who do not attain a given performance threshold. There is
also a growing literature relating to bonuses, emanating from Healy (1985), in which CEO’s
seek to shift earnings (i.e. output performance) to later periods whenever performance exceeds
an upper threshold.6
It is apparent from the above discussion that whether relative or absolute performance is the
chosen measurement criteria for dismissal depends on the nature of shocks and the underlying
economic reasoning. However, it is not the whole story since legal frameworks and employment
lawmay also play important roles. There are varying limitations across different judicial regions
on when you can fire workers – see, for instance, Blau and Kahn (1999) for a discussion of
employment-protection legislation that makes it costly or difficult for employers to terminate
jobswithout cause. If such legislation is enforced and absolute standards of performance are used
in court or in industrial tribunals, then these legal restrictionsmay suggest that absolute standards
in firing may be more appropriate than relative performance criteria to determine dismissals.
Thus, absolute performance measures may be particularly applicable to legal jurisdictions with
extensive employment protection, such as the original member countries of the European Union.
The legal argument for absolute performance may apply to a lesser extent in the United States
where the general rule is that firms have the right to fire at will, although even here unjust firing
laws exists.
We proceed in Section II to develop a model which maintains an absolute standard of ac-
ceptable worker related output, below which workers are fired, to investigate the interdependent
effects of standards, effort, wages and the probability of shirker detection. In Section III we
conclude.
6For an exposition on how bonuses relate to two thresholds – a lower one where bonuses kick in and a
higher one where bonuses are capped – see Murphy (1999, 2013) and Murphy and Jensen (2011).
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4 Bulletin of Economic Research
II. THE MODEL
We present an efficiency wage model in the Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) tradition that is extended
to include a stochastic element. We consider the case where the firm observes worker output
but where output is a function of both worker effort and an idiosyncratic stochastic shock.
Workers are retained and paid the efficiency wage providing their observed output does not fall
below a defined standard. Given our focus of endogenising the probability of detecting shirking
behaviour, we do not model the unemployment consequences of the efficiency wage on the
wider labour market.
To conceptualise the informational context of our model it is helpful to consider the time
sequence for each period t illustrated in Figure 1 following:
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 
Effort 
chosen 
Worker 
idiosyncratic 
shock (private 
information to 
worker)
tuptuO
realised 
Contract variables: 
Wage and standard 
set by firm 
Payment if 
output at least 
meets the 
standard 
otherwise 
dismissal 
Fig. 1. The informational context in each time period. [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
In Stage 1, for each period t, the contract variables are set by the firm vis. the wage and
standard. In Stage 2 an effort level is chosen by the worker but is not necessarily known by the
firm. After effort is chosen the worker experiences an idiosyncratic shock to his productivity
in Stage 3, which the firm cannot observe. Output, however, is realised as and is common
knowledge in Stage 4. Finally, in Stage 5, a worker is remunerated if output at least equals the
standard and is dismissed otherwise.
Formally, we assume that workers are identical, risk neutral and endowed with a separable
utility function, u(w, e) = w − c(e), where w and e ∈ [0, e+] denote income and worker effort
respectively and where c(·) is a continuous and convex cost function with dc(e)/de ≡ c′(e) > 0,
d2c(e)/de2 ≡ c′′(e) > 0 and c(0) = c′(0) = 0.7 Each worker is associated with a stochastic
output function, yi = θi f (e), which varies with state i. Workers choose effort prior to the
realisation of this output shock and technology is such that d f (e)/de ≡ f ′(e) > 0, d2 f (e)/de2 ≡
f ′′(e) < 0, f (0) = 0 and f ′(0) =∞. The shift-parameter, θi , represents a random shock to
productivity in state i and is uniformly distributed between θL and θH > θL . For an individual
worker θi reflects relative misfortune (when it is low) or luck (when it is high).
The firm’s objective is to maximise per-worker expected profit, π = E{θi f (e)}− w , subject
to providing the worker with at least his outside option (e.g., unemployment insurance) utility
b < w .8 Writing this participation constraint as:
u (wr , e) = wr − c (e) = b
⇒
wr = wr (b, e) = c (e)+ b
(1)
yields an inverse function in which the reservation wage, wr , depends on effort and the
outside option. The nature of this relationship is ascertained from totally differentiating
7Note that the function c(e) = Aeα , where α > 1, which naturally embeds the quadratic cost function,
satisfies these conditions.
8Note that we have normalised the product price to equal unity for the sake of simplicity.
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Shirking, Standards and the Probability of Detection 5
expression (1) vis: dwr/de ≡ wre(b, e) = c′(e) > 0; d2wr/de2 ≡ wree(b, e) = c′′(e) > 0;
dwr/db ≡ wrb(b, e) = 1 > 0 and d2wr/db2 ≡ wrbb(b, e) = 0, Thus, the firm’s profit maximis-
ing level of effort, e∗, is defined implicitly from:
∂π (b, e)
∂e
= πe (b, e∗) = θi f ′(e∗)− we (b, e∗) = 0 (2)
The problem facing the firm is that whilst it is able to observe worker output, it is unable to
observe either worker effort, e, or ‘luck’, θi . Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to assume that
in some instances effort can be partially deduced. To reflect this, consider the case where the
firm sets a ‘standard’; that is, a minimum level of output, y˜, that the worker must attain in
order to be retained in the workplace, determined by the lowest possible output produced by a
non-shirking worker.9 We define a critical realisation to a shirker of the random shock, θ˜ , below
which shirking (i.e. supplying less than required effort) will always be detected. Formally, we
assume:
y˜ = θL f (e∗) = θ˜ f (e¯) (3)
where e∗ denotes the firm’s choice level of effort and e¯ < e∗ denotes the ‘shirking’ level of
effort. It thus follows that the worst case scenario when the worker supplies the firm’s desired
level of effort in the least favourable state of nature defines implicitly a critical state of nature at
which anything less than required effort will be detected. The critical state therefore satisfies:
θ˜ ≡ θ˜ (e¯, e∗) = θL f (e
∗)
f (e¯)
(4)
It is apparent that the critical state is increasing in the firm’s desired level of effort and decreasing
in shirking effort:
∂θ˜
∂e∗
≡ θ˜e∗ (e¯, e∗) = θL f
′(e∗)
f (e¯)
> 0 (5)
∂θ˜
∂ e¯
≡ θ˜e¯ (e¯, e∗) = −θL f (e
∗) f ′(e)
[ f (e¯)]2
< 0 (6)
Intuitively, a higher desired level of effort, e∗, on the part of the firm raises the acceptable
bar of output performance (i.e. the standard y˜) resulting in more states in which shirking is
identifiable. Thus, the temptation to shirk declines with the equilibrium level of non-shirking
effort as potential shirkers can expect to be detected more frequently and must hence hope for
a higher realisation of luck to avoid being dismissed.
These assumptions are represented in Figure 2 and Figure 3 following. Recalling that both a
shirker and a non-shirker choose their effort level prior to the realisation of the state of the world,
the figures reflect possible output levels. The two upward sloping lines in Figure 2 depict the
outputs generated by a shirking worker, y¯i = θi f (e¯), and a non-shirking worker, y∗i = θi f (e∗).
Since the firm is only able to observe output, but not its constituent elements (i.e. effort and
luck), it is unable to distinguish between a shirker whose productivity realisation is θ˜ (e¯, e∗) and
a non-shirker whose productivity realisation is at the lower bound θL . More generally, the firm
is unable to detect shirking at any productivity realisation θi ≥ θ˜ (e¯, e∗). Shirking is, however,
detectable at any productivity realisation θi < θ˜ (e¯, e∗) since the revenue from shirking here falls
short of the lowest output possible for a non-shirker.
9Thus, no non-shirking worker will be fired though some shirking workers could survive. Proposition 1
and Corollary 1 to follow, determine the conditions for when setting such a standard is optimal for the firm.
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6 Bulletin of Economic Research
yi
e ,e( )
y
yi = i f e( )
yi = i f e( )
iHL
yH
yL
Fig. 2. Critical ‘luck’. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
yi
y0 yi = i f e( )
yi = i f e1( )
y1
yi = i f e0( )
e ,e1( )L H i
yL
yH
e ,e0( )
Fig. 3. Critical ‘luck’ and effort. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
In terms of Figure 3, an increase in the equilibrium non-shirking level of effort from e∗0
to e∗1 > e
∗
0 , which is equivalent to an increase in the standard from y˜0 to y˜1 > y˜0, increases
the critical shift parameter from θ˜ (e¯, e∗0) to θ˜ (e¯, e
∗
1) > θ˜(e¯, e
∗
0). Thus, as the lowest possi-
ble output for non-shirkers increases, potential shirkers need to be even luckier to avoid
detection.
Let us depart for the time being from the case where the standard is set and restricted by
(3), and instead consider the case where the firm can set any standard y, where y does not
necessarily equal y˜. In this context, consider the worker’s decision problem over effort vis.
supplying the effort required to attain the standard or supplying a lower (i.e., shirking) level of
effort. We now allow for both type-1 and type-2 errors such that shirking (non-shirking) workers
may be inadvertently retained (fired). The supply of effort from non-shirking workers will be
determined by an incentive compatible ‘non-shirking constraint’ (NSC). This specifies the
lowest wage a worker will accept in return for supplying a given level of effort or, equivalently,
the maximum effort the worker will supply for a given wage. Intuitively, workers will provide
C⃝ 2017 Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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Shirking, Standards and the Probability of Detection 7
the firm’s required level of effort, e∗, if the expected utility from so doing is at least as great as
that from shirking. The NSC is thus:
(1− pˆ)w + pˆb − c (e∗) ≥ pb + (1− p)w − c (e¯) (7)
where p and pˆ denote respectively the probabilities that a shirker and non-shirker are fired. The
dismissal probability for a non-shirker given a standard y is:
pˆ =
⎧⎨⎩
0 if y ≤ y˜
θ cn − θL
θH − θL otherwise
(8)
where θ cn = y/ f (e∗) denotes the critical state at which non-shirkers are fired given the standard
y. The dismissal probability for a shirker is given by:
p =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if y ≤ yL
θ cs − θL
θH − θL otherwise
1 if y ≥ yH
(9)
where yL = θL f (e¯), yH = θH f (e¯) and θ cs = y/ f (e¯) denotes the critical state at which non-
shirkers are fired given a standard y.
Satisfaction of the NSC implies an incentive compatible (i.e., efficiency) wage schedule:
w ∗ = b +
[
c (e∗)− c (e¯)
p − pˆ
]
(10)
The efficiency wage, w ∗, is the lowest wage compatible with the provision of a given level
of non-shirking effort e∗. It is increasing in the worker’s outside unemployment opportu-
nity, b, and effort cost, c(.), since the firm will have to pay more to induce effort when
alternative employment prospects are good and when the supply of effort is more onerous.
The wage is also increasing in the probability, pˆ, of high effort workers being inadver-
tently sacked. In contrast, the wage is decreasing in the probability, p, of the correct de-
tection of shirkers with workers becoming more wary of shirking as the risk of detection
increases. Since both of these probabilities are functions of the standard, a potential trade-off
emerges.
The trade-off can be seen graphically in Figure 2. Should the firm choose to set a standard
y = y˜ then it would retain all non-shirkers whilst unlucky shirkers would be fired. If the standard
is set above y˜ such that y > y˜ then the probability of shirkers being fired increases. The shirkers
would in essence need to ride their luck more often. Thus the firm would not retain the low
effort workers as often. However, the firm would now start making firing mistakes in the
sense that it would on occasion fire the wrong type of worker; the high effort non-shirkers.
Whilst there might be an advantage in raising the standard above y˜ to punish the shirkers
more often, there is an associated cost of unfairly punishing hard working employees. There
is no advantage of increasing the standard above yH as all shirkers will then have already
been fired. There is on the other hand no point in having a standard below y˜ as the firm
would simply be punishing the shirkers less often whilst retaining all non-shirkers. Thus the
range of operative standards must be y ∈ [y˜, yH ). Clearly, no standards will be set outside this
range.
It is apparent from Figure 3 that the range of possible standards [y˜, yH ) is a function of
the non-shirkers effort level. Consider the case where we for simplicity assume a fixed level
C⃝ 2017 Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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8 Bulletin of Economic Research
of shirking effort such that the output idiosyncratic shock level (the upward sloping curve) of
shirkers remains fixed. Now let the non-shirkers experience an exogenous change in their effort
level such that their upward sloping output-luck locus shifts leftward and up. At any given luck
realisation the non-shirkers output increases. This implies that shirkers will on average have
to be luckier to be retained by the firm since the critical output y˜ increases; y˜ : y˜0 → y˜1 with
higher effort. Thus the range of possible standards shrinks.
Assuming that the firm sets a standard y˜ = θL f (e∗), such that only shirking workers are fired,
then the probability of a shirker being detected and fired is given by:
p
[
θ˜ (e¯, e∗)
] ≡ [y˜/ f (e¯)]− θL
θH − θL =
θ˜ (e¯, e∗)− θL
θH − θL =
θL
θH − θL
[
f (e∗)
f (e¯)
− 1
]
(11)
In this case, the worker’s decision problem regarding effort is given by:
max
e¯
E {u (w, e¯)} = p [θ˜ (e¯, e∗)] b + {1− p [θ˜ (e¯, e∗)]}w − c (e¯) (12)
where:
p
[
θ˜ (e¯, e∗)
] =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 if e¯ ≥ e∗
θL
θH − θL
[
f (e∗)
f (e¯)
− 1
]
otherwise
(13)
Clearly, there will either be an interior (i.e., shirking) or corner (i.e., non-shirking) solution to
this maximisation problem. If the former, then the worker’s optimal choice of effort, e¯, is derived
implicitly from the first order condition:
∂E {u (w, e¯)}
∂ e¯
= f
′(e¯)
f (e¯)2
[
θL f (e∗)
(θH − θL)
]
(w − b)− c′(e¯) = 0
⇒ (14)
f ′(e¯)
f (e¯)2
[
θL f (e∗)
(θH − θL)
]
(w − b) = c′(e¯)
Intuitively, a potential shirker will provide effort up to the point at which the marginal ben-
efit from so doing, namely the reduction in the probability of losing the rent of wages over
unemployment insurance, equals the marginal cost of increasing effort.
Assuming y˜ = θL f (e∗), then the worker’s NSC reduces to:
w − c (e∗) ≥ p [θ˜ (e¯, e∗)] b + {1− p [θ˜ (e¯, e∗)]}w − c (e¯) (15)
Satisfaction of the reduced NSC implies an incentive compatible (i.e., efficiency) wage
schedule:
w ∗ = b + p[θ˜ (e¯, e∗)]−1 [c (e∗)− c (e¯)] (16)
The efficiency wage, w ∗, is the lowest wage compatible with the provision of a given level of
non-shirking effort e∗ (i.e., the standard y˜). It follows a similar intuition to expression (10).
For instance, higher detection probabilities of shirkers still shade the necessary effort-inducing
wage that the firm is obliged to offer.
Increasing the standard beyond the point at which only the shirkers are sacked to regions
where non-shirkers also face unemployment risk will have an a priori ambiguous effect on
wages. However, consider the conditions under which the firm will not find it optimal to
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Shirking, Standards and the Probability of Detection 9
diverge from a standard where only shirkers are sacked. This occurs when non-shirkers are
always retained. Formally:
Proposition 1. The firm will find it optimal to set the standard y˜ = θL f (e∗) iff ∂p/∂y >
0, ∀y and (∂p/∂y)− (∂ pˆ/∂y) < 0, ∀y > y˜.
Proof. From expression ((10)) above it follows that the firm’s expected profit can be written:
E {π} = E {θi f (e∗)}− w ∗ = E {θi f (e∗)}− b −
[
c(e∗)− c (e¯)
p − pˆ
]
(17)
The firm will choose effort e∗ and the standard y to maximise profit.10 The latter choice variable
yields the following first order total derivative:
dπ
dy
=
[
(∂p/∂y)− (∂ pˆ/∂y)] [c (e∗)− c (e¯)]
(p − pˆ)2 +
∂π
∂e∗
· ∂e
∗
∂y
(18)
where ∂π/∂e∗ = 0 from expression (2). It therefore follows that sgn(dπ/dy) =
sgn[(∂p/∂y)− (∂ pˆ/∂y)]. From expression (8) we have ∂ pˆ/∂y > 0 if y ≤ y˜. In addition, if
(∂p/∂y)− (∂ pˆ/∂y) < 0, ∀y > y˜ then:
sgn
(
dπ
dy
)
=
{
> 0 if y < y˜
< 0 if y > y˜
(19)
With a continuous profit function it thus follows that expected profit is maximised
at y = y˜. !
Proposition 1’s dependence on (∂p/∂y)− (∂ pˆ/∂y) may be given an intuitive explanation. Con-
sider the efficiency wage schedule set out in expression (10) previously, where it follows that if
the sign of (∂p/∂y)− (∂ pˆ/∂y) is positive (negative) then an increase in the standard will reduce
(increase) the efficiency wage needed to ensure incentive compatibility. With the conditions of
Proposition 1 it follows that when y > y˜, an increase in the standard will necessitate a higher
efficiency wage such that the firm’s profit is declining in the standard. Conversely, an increase
in the standard when y < y˜ will reduce the efficiency wage required to induce non-shirking
such that the firm’s profit is increasing in the standard. It therefore follows that an increase in
the standard will increase profits wheny < y˜ and decrease profits when y > y˜. It thus follows
that the firm’s profits are maximised when the standard is set at y = y˜.
That is not all. Further insight follows from Proposition 1 by considering the elasticities of
effort with respect to the standard for shirkers and non-shirkers:
Corollary 1. The firm will find it optimal to set the standard y˜ = θL f (e∗) iff εn is suffi-
ciently small in comparison to εs , where εn ≡ (∂e∗/∂y)(y/e∗) and εs ≡ (∂ e¯/∂y)(y/e¯) denote
respectively the elasticity of non-shirking effort and shirking effort with respect to the
standard.
Proof. Note:
∂p
∂y
= 1
θH − θL
{
f (e¯)− e¯ f ′ (e¯) εs
[ f (e¯)]2
}
∀y ∈ (yL, yH ) (20)
10Note that the firm is therefore also implicitly choosing the probabilities of being laid off as well as the
efficiency wage.
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10 Bulletin of Economic Research
Thus, ∂p/∂y > 0 iff εs ≤ 1. Similarly:
∂ pˆ
∂y
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
0 if y ≤ y˜
1
θH − θL
{
f (e∗)− e∗ f ′(e∗)εn
[ f (e∗)]2
}
otherwise
(21)
Thus, ∂ pˆ/∂y > 0 if εs ≤ 1. Corollary 1 now follows directly from Proposition 1. !
Proposition 1 puts in essence restrictions on how responsive in terms of effort shirkers are to
standards as compared to non-shirkers. Proposition 1 intuitively holds as long shirkers’ effort is
sufficiently responsive to standards.Wewill henceforth assume that Proposition 1 and Corollary
1 hold such that the firm sets the standard as determined by expression (4).
Assuming then that the firm sets a standard y˜ = θL f (e∗) such that only shirking work-
ers are fired, then the probability of a shirker being detected and fired is therefore de-
termined by expresson (11). In contrast to the conventional efficiency wage story, this
probability is determined endogenously by the equilibrium level of effort. Indeed, we now
derive:
Proposition 2. The probability of detecting shirking depends positively on the equilibrium
effort level of non-shirkers.
Proof. Partial differentiation of expression (11) above yields ∂p/∂e∗ = θ˜e∗ (e¯, e∗)/
(θH − θL) = θL f ′(e∗)/ f (e¯)(θH − θL) > 0. !
As Proposition 2 states and Figure 3 illustrates, the probability of detecting (and thus dismiss-
ing) a shirker increases with equilibrium effort since this raises the critical shift parameter,
leaving the transgressor less states in which to hide. That is, workers who raise their ef-
fort level to the gratification of firms do so to the detriment of potential shirkers who are
more readily identifiable. Proposition 2 thus stands in sharp contrast to previous literature
in which effort and detection probabilities are unrelated.11 As equilibrium effort effectively
determines the critical dismissal-retention output, y˜, we can also draw inferences between
standards and the probability of detection. Thus, within an efficiency wage framework we
find that increasing standards increases the probability of detection. This echoes the findings
of Rasmusen and Zenger (1990) who, using a teamwork model of agency in the Holmstrom
(1982) tradition, demonstrate that the probability of detecting shirking increases with the output
target set.
The expected utility from shirking, which is detected only if θ < θ˜ , is given by:
u (e¯, e∗) = pb + (1− p)w − c (e¯) (22)
It can be shown that shirking workers will never provide zero effort. To be sure:
Proposition 3. A shirking worker will operate in the region e¯ ∈ (0, e∗).
Proof. See Appendix. !
If the probability of detecting shirking is endogenous then it follows that shirkers will not
necessarily exert zero effort, as is commonly assumed in the efficiency wage literature. Whilst
shirkers by definition exert less effort than that required by the firm, they trade off the cost of
11Though not directly linked, Proposition 1 suggests a fair amount of introspection with respect to effort
in relation to internal effort levels within the firm, not dissimilar to the discussion in Akerlof and Yellen
(1990) and Danthine and Kurmann (2009) where the central theme is the relative wage within the firm as
opposed to an external reference wage.
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Shirking, Standards and the Probability of Detection 11
effort against the reduction in the detection probability and do best by exerting at least some
effort.
Note that if the standard is set sufficiently high, or thewage sufficiently low, then all (identical)
workers will shirk – in the sense that they fail to provide the level of effort consistent with always
attaining the standard set by the firm. They then will all run the risk of being fired. In this case
we note:
Proposition 4. When all workers shirk an increase in the wage will increase shirking effort
such that de¯/dw > 0.
Proof. This can be demonstrated by totally differentiating the first-order utility maximising
condition (given in the proof of Proposition 3) with respect to wages and effort.
de¯
dw
=
∂p
∂ e¯
∂2 p
∂ e¯2
(b − w)− c′′ (e¯)
⇒ (23)
de¯
dw
= f
′ (e¯) f (e¯)[
f ′′ (e¯) f (e¯)− 2 f ′(e¯)2] (b − w)+ c′′ (e¯) f (e¯)3 [ (θH−θL )
θL f (e∗)
] > 0
since:
∂p
∂ e¯
= − f
′(e¯)
f (e¯)2
[
θL f (e∗)
(θH − θL)
]
< 0 (24)
And:
∂2 p
∂ e¯2
= −
[
f ′′(e¯) f (e¯)− 2 f ′(e¯)2
f (e¯)3
] [
θL f (e∗)
(θH − θL)
]
> 0 (25)
!
The conventional efficiency wage result that wages and effort are positively correlated is
retained. Higher wages increase the fear of dismissal and induce shirkers to raise effort, albeit
not necessarily to the required standard.
We are now able to draw inferences as regards how shirkers react to standards within the firm
and outside opportunities.
Proposition 5. Shirkers will exert: (a) more effort the higher the standard,y˜ (as reflected
by a higher e∗) set by the firm; and (b) less effort the higher the outside option utility, b:
Proof. Part (a) can be demonstrated by totally differentiating the first-order utility maximising
condition (given in the proof of Proposition 3) with respect to shirking effort,e¯, and standard
(i.e., non-shirking) effort, e*:
de¯
de∗
= −
[
∂2 p
∂ e¯∂e∗ (b − w)
∂2 p
∂ e˜2
(b − w)− c′′ (e¯)
]
⇒ (26)
de¯
de∗
= −
[
f ′ (e∗) f ′ (e¯) f (e¯) θL (b − w)
&θL f (e∗) (b − w)+ c′′ (e¯) f (e¯)3 (θH − θL)
]
> 0
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where & = f ′′(e¯) f (e¯)− 2 f ′(e¯)2. Part (b) can similarly be proven by differentiating this condi-
tion with respect to shirking effort, e¯, and outside option utility, b, yielding:
de¯
db
= −
[
∂p
∂ e¯
∂2 p
∂ e¯2
(b − w)− c′′ (e¯)
]
⇒ (27)
de¯
db
= −
⎧⎨⎩ f ′(e¯) f (e¯)& (b − w)+ c′′ (e¯) f (e¯)3 [ (θH−θL )
θL f (e∗)
]
⎫⎬⎭ < 0
!
Proposition 5 reflects the considerations a potential shirker makes with respect to the possibility
of being detected and fired, and so forfeiting wages in exchange for unemployment utility.
Increasing the standard, y˜ (i.e. raising the required non-shirking effort level e∗), as in part (a),
is equivalent to the firm becoming less tolerant as regards low output. Thus, the probability
of a shirker being detected is effectively increased as result of the firm’s higher standards. To
countervail this effect, the shirker responds by increasing effort. The penalty of being detected
is simply the difference between the wage if employed and unemployment utility if fired. Any
increase in the latter, as in part (b), will have an adverse effect on effort. This is a common result
in the traditional shirking literature, where typically no one shirks in equilibrium. The novel
aspect here is that this result translates into a situation where some or all workers shirk.12
Returning to expression (16), it follows that since both the cost of effort and the probability
of detection of shirkers are positively correlated with effort but oppositely (i.e., cost of effort –
positively; probability of detection – negatively) correlated with the wage, that a new complexity
has arisen whereby the relationship between the incentive compatible wage and effort is not
unambiguously positive. To be sure:
Proposition 6. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the positive supply-side cor-
relation between the (efficiency) wage and (non-shirking) effort (i.e., ∂e∗/∂w ∗ > 0) is that
the elasticity of the probability of detection of shirkers with respect to non-shirking effort,
η∗, is less than unity.
Proof. From expression (16) it follows that:
∂e∗
∂w ∗
= p
c′ (e∗)− [c (e∗)− c (e¯)] ∂p
∂e∗
1
p
= pe
∗
c′ (e∗) e∗ − η∗ [c (e∗)− c (e¯)] (28)
whereη∗ = (∂p/∂e∗)(e∗/p) > 0 denotes the elasticity of the probability of detectionwith respect
to effort and p ≡ p[θ˜ (e¯, e∗)]. Since c′(e∗)e∗ − c(e∗) > 0 by the convexity of the cost function,
the proposition follows.13 !
12This is in the tradition of Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) – hereafter SS – where no worker shirks in
equilibrium.However, unlike SS – see following -wemake no inference about the involuntary unemployment
implications of the efficiency wage w∗: ‘From the worker’s point of view, unemployment is involuntary:
those without jobs would be happy to work at w∗ or lower, but cannot make a credible promise not to shirk
at such wages.’ [SS (1984), p. 438]. Whilst we recognise that the higher (non-shirking) wage in our model
may induce involuntary unemployment, as the unemployed workers outside the firm would prefer to work
at the firm, it is not the focus of our paper.
13Proposition 5 contains a sufficiency but not a necessary requirement since effort may rise with the wage
even if η∗ > 1 when c(·) is sufficiently convex or when the difference between shirking and non-shirking
effort is sufficiently small.
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Shirking, Standards and the Probability of Detection 13
Proposition 6 illustrates a potential fissure in the positive link between efficiency wages and
effort. Only by constraining the effect of effort on the probability of detection to be relatively
small as compared to the effect of effort on the worker’s cost (i.e., disutility of effort), are
we able to retain the intuitively attractive positive correlation between the supply of effort and
wages. This condition resembles those in Walsh (1999) and Strobl and Walsh (2007), both of
whom find that whether wages are positively or negatively related to the level of monitoring
depends critically on the shape of the worker’s effort supply curve and, in particular, whether the
elasticity of the worker’s disutility of effort is increasing or decreasing in effort. The intuition
behind Proposition 6 is simple and is found in a clear-cut interpretation of the efficiency wage
schedule given by expression (16). The efficiency wage is greater the higher is the required
non-shirking effort and the lower is the probability of shirker detection. If the shirkers response
to non-shirker effort is sufficiently elastic it follows that the positive correlation between effort
and wages can be broken. Thus, Proposition 6, viewed in isolation, raises concerns over the
central efficiency wage tenet of a positive correlation between wages and effort.
The concern deepens when, in a similar manner, we draw conclusions regarding the level of
non-shirker effort exertion and changes in unemployment insurance:
Proposition 7. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the negative supply-side corre-
lation between unemployment insurance and (non-shirking) effort (i.e., ∂e∗/∂b < 0) is that
the elasticity of the probability of detection with respect to the latter, η∗, is less than unity.
Proof. The proof follows the proof of Proposition 6 closely and is therefore omitted. !
Thus, and contrary to previous efficiency literature, we are no longer certain that higher unem-
ployment insurance results in lower effort. As was the case for Proposition 6, this can be given
some simple intuition through expression (16). The effort at a given efficiency wage should
fall with the level of unemployment benefits, as long as the probability of detection of shirkers
remain constant. However, the probability of detection does not remain unchanged, and herein
lies the breakdown of the standard result.
We now turn to the firm’s behaviour when it sets standards at such a level that no workers
shirk in equilibrium. The analysis surrounding Propositions 6 and 7 is supply driven; rather than
tying down a particular wage-effort combination, it investigated an incentive compatible locus
of wage and effort combinations. To identify the equilibrium level of effort and the efficient
wage from this locus, we turn to the demand side where the firm maximises profits subject to
workers behaving according to their previously determined supply (i.e., pay-effort) schedule.
Thus, armed with the knowledge of how workers respond in terms of effort to changes in pay,
the firm will set the level of compensation that maximises profit. We now derive:
Proposition 8. The firm will always choose an operational wage such that ∂e∗/∂w ∗ > 0.
Proof. From (2) and (27) it follows that:
∂π
∂e∗
= θi f ′(e∗)−
c′ (e∗)− [c (e∗)− c (e¯)] ∂p
∂e∗
p2
= 0
⇒ (29)
θi f ′(e∗) =
c′ (e∗)− [c (e∗)− c (e¯)] ∂p
∂e∗
1
p
p
Note that since the left hand side of (29) is positive the right hand side by deduction also has to
be positive. From expression (28) the proposition follows. !
C⃝ 2017 Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
boer12143 W3G-boer.cls August 30, 2017 15:53
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
14 Bulletin of Economic Research
Proposition 8 thus stands in contrast to the discussion following Proposition 6, which suggested
that workers would, under certain circumstances, want to reduce their effort in response to an
increase in wages. Indeed, it offers a resolution to the problematic result, contrary to the central
premise of the efficiency wage literature, that higher wages might in some situations induce
lower effort. Proposition 8 states that firmswill always set wages such that the positive efficiency
wage correlation betweenwages and effort holds. There is, however, no internal conflict between
the conditions that underpin Proposition 6 and Proposition 8. Instead it is merely a reflection
of profit maximisation, for whilst Proposition 6 merely reflects supply responses, both demand
and supply factors play a role in Proposition 8 thus assuring the best possible outcome for the
firm in terms of profit. Note that given Proposition 8, and given the close relationship between
Proposition 6 and Proposition 7, it must also be true that the firm operates in a region where an
increase in unemployment insurance will induce a decline in effort.
This result is akin to the Stigler (1956) argument that a profit maximising monopolist should
always operate at the elastic part of a monopolist’s demand curve. Our paper argues similarly,
by implication of Propositions 6 and 8, that a profit maximising firm will operate where the
elasticity of detection is not too elastic. Given the efficiency wage schedule in expression (16),
it will never be optimal to operate in the region where an increase in wage yields a lower
effort, as this would reduce profits. Thus, given Proposition 6, the firm should operate where
the probability of detection is not too elastic with respect to non-shirkers’ effort. Proposition 8
shows formally that a profit maximising firm will always operate where an increase in wages
yields larger levels of effort.
III. FINAL COMMENTS
Our model as it stands illustrates a more nuanced picture regarding wages, effort and standards
than previously acknowledged. Shirkers are no longer those workers who provide zero effort.
They are instead those who neglect their duties by working less than required and who act
rationally in so doing by trading off the cost of effort and the probability of detection. Thus,
they work harder the higher the wage and the higher the standard set by the firm. By assuming
continuous effort and endogenous detection, we identify conditions under which higher wages
reduce effort whereas higher unemployment insurance increases effort, both of which raise
questions regarding the validity of the efficiency wage literature. We nevertheless offer a
resolution to this set of two potentially disturbing results as our case is demonstrated to apply
only to the supply side. For when we also take into account the demand side it becomes evident
that the firm will always choose to to operate in the region where workers respond to higher
wages or lower unemployment insurance by increasing effort.
Monitoring technology has been central to large swathes of the efficiencywage literature. And
whilst there are good and natural reasons for this, a departure from a focus on monitoring to one
where observable output is used as a signal for effort has allowed us to construct a stochastic
efficiency wage model within which we can investigate the largely neglected connections
between standards and efficiency wages. The model we have proposed is one in which workers
face idiosyncratic shocks to their output. As such, it is natural that the firm should use absolute
performance criteria when considering firing. Were we to alter this assumption and consider
the case where shocks instead are common to all workers, it may be more appropriate to use
relative performance measures, with a relatively poor performance by a worker being used as
the trigger mechanism resulting in a dismissal. Whilst such ‘avoid the drop’ tournaments are
worthy of further investigation, they have remained unexplored here and are instead left for
future research.
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